It may be objected that in some wars, as where the population is hostile, it may be very difficult, or impracticable, to organize lines of depots. In such cases they will certainly be exposed to great dangers; but these are the very cases where they are most necessary and should be most numerous. The line from Bayonne to Madrid was such a line, which resisted for four years the attacks of the guerrillas,—although convoys were sometimes seized. At one time the line extended as far as Cadiz.

I shall be accused, I suppose, of saying that no event in war can ever occur which may not be foreseen and provided for. To prove the falsity of this accusation, it is sufficient for me to cite the surprises of Cremona, Berg-op-zoom, and Hochkirch. I am still of the opinion, however, that such events even as these might always have been anticipated, entirely or in part, as at least within the limits of probability or possibility.

When the above was written, the magnetic telegraph was not known.—Translators.

Thus, the army of the Rhine was composed of a right wing of three divisions under Lecourbe, of a center of three divisions under Saint-Cyr, and of a left of two divisions under Saint-Suzanne, the general-in-chief having three divisions more as a reserve under his own immediate orders.