to allow Mexico to save her point of honor by negotiating, ere the city was entered, and while she could yet proclaim to her citizens and the world, that her capital had never been seized by the enemy. This assuaged national vanity, and preserved the last vantage ground upon which the nation might stand with pride if not with perfect confidence. It still left something to the conquered people which was not necessary or valuable to us.
There are other matters, unquestionably, that weighed much in the very responsible deliberations of General Scott. If our army entered the city triumphantly, or took it by assault, the frail elements of government still lingering at that period of disorganization, would either fly or be utterly destroyed. All who were in power, in that nation of jealous politicians and wily intriguers would be eager to shun the last responsibility. If Santa Anna should be utterly beaten, the disgrace would blot out the last traces of his remaining prestige. If so fatal a disaster occurred, as subsequent events proved, the Americans would be most unfortunately situated in relation to peace, for there would be no government to negotiate with! Santa Anna's government was the only constitutional one that had existed in Mexico for a long period, and with such a legalized national authority peace must be concluded. It was not our duty to destroy a government and then gather the fragments to reconstruct another with which we might treat. If a revolutionary, or provisional authority existed, what prospect had we of enduring pacification? What guaranty did we hold in a treaty celebrated with a military despot, a temporary chief, or a sudden usurper, that such a treaty could be maintained before the nation? What constitutional or legal right would an American general or commissioner have, to enter into such a compact? Was it not, therefore, Scott's duty to act with such tender caution as not to endanger the fate of the only man who might still keep himself at the head of his rallied people?