men and the intrigues of the time, he would have been mad not to guard against the risk of ruin, and, accordingly, his first efforts were directed rather towards obtaining the ultimatum of the United States, than to pledging his own government in any project which might prove either presently unpopular or destroy his future influence. The instructions, therefore, that were given to General José J. de Herrera, Bernardo Couto, Ignacio Mora y Villamil and Miguel Atristain, the Mexican commissioners, were couched in such extreme terms, that much could be yielded before there was a likelihood of approaching the American demands. In the meanwhile, as negotiations progressed, Mexico obtained time to rally her soldiers, to appease those who were discontented with the proposed peace, and to abjure the project if it should be found either inadmissible or impossible of accomplishment without loss of popularity.
For several days consultations took place between Mr. Trist and the commissioners, but it was soon found that the American pretensions in regard to the position of Texas, the boundary of the Rio Grande and the cession of New Mexico and Upper California, were
of such a character that the Mexicans would not yield to them at the present moment. The popular feeling, stimulated by the rivals of Santa Anna, his enemies, and the demagogues, was entirely opposed to the surrender of territory. Sensible as the President was, that the true national interests demanded instantaneous peace, he was dissuaded by his confidential advisers from presenting a counter projét, which would have resulted in a treaty. Congress, moreover, had virtually dissolved by the precipitate departure of most of its members after the battles of the 20th.
All the party leaders labored diligently at this crisis, but none of them with cordiality for Santa Anna, in whose negotiations of a successful peace with the United States, they either foresaw or feared the