to say: all that can be said is, that it has fallen in relation to one thing, and risen in respect to another. Suppose, for example, that an invention has been made in machinery, by which broadcloth could be woven at half the former cost. The effect of this would be to lower the value of a coat, and, if lowered by this cause, it would be lowered not in relation to bread only or to glass only, but to all purchasable things, except such as happened to be affected at the very time by a similar depressing cause. Those [changes] which originate in the commodities with which we compare it affect its value in relation to those commodities; but those which originate in itself affect its value in relation to all commodities.
There is such a thing as a general rise of prices. All commodities may rise in their money price. But there can not be a general rise of values. It is a contradiction in terms. A can only rise in value by exchanging for a greater quantity of B and C; in which case these must exchange for a smaller quantity of A. All things can not rise relatively to one another. If one half of the commodities in the market rise in exchange value, the very terms imply a fall of the other half; and, reciprocally, the fall implies a rise. Things which are exchanged for one another can no more all fall, or all rise, than a dozen runners can each outrun all the rest, or a hundred trees all overtop one another. A general rise or a general fall of prices is merely tantamount to an alteration [pg 251] in the value of money, and is a matter of complete indifference, save in so far as it affects existing contracts for receiving and paying fixed pecuniary amounts.
Before commencing the inquiry into the laws of value and price, I have one further observation to make. I must