for the food of the people; and the Navigation Laws were grounded, in theory and profession, on the necessity of keeping up a “nursery of seamen” for the navy. On this last subject I at once admit that the object is worth the sacrifice; and that a country exposed to invasion by sea, if it can not otherwise have sufficient ships and sailors of its own to secure the means of manning on an emergency an adequate fleet, is quite right in obtaining those means, even at an economical sacrifice in point of cheapness of transport. When the English navigation laws were enacted, the Dutch, from their maritime skill and their low rate of profit at home, were able to carry for other nations, England included, at cheaper rates than those nations could carry for themselves: which placed all other countries at a great comparative disadvantage in obtaining experienced seamen for their ships of war. The navigation laws, by which this deficiency was remedied, and at the same time a blow struck against the maritime power of a nation with which England was then frequently engaged in hostilities, were probably, though economically disadvantageous, politically expedient. But English ships and sailors can now navigate as cheaply as those of any other country, maintaining at least an equal competition with the other maritime nations even in their own trade. The ends which may once have justified navigation laws require them no longer, and afford no reason for maintaining this invidious exception to the general rule of free trade.
Since the introduction of steamships and the advance of invention in naval contrivances, the plea for navigation laws on the ground that they keep up a “nursery of seamen” for the navy is practically obsolete. The “seaman” employed on the modern naval ships more nearly resembles the artisan in a manufacturing establishment; he need have but comparatively little knowledge of the sea, since the days of sailing-vessels have passed