CodalSearch this book — or all of Codal…⌘K
nydus/The Genealogy of MoralsPublic
EnglishEspañol
Page 141 of 194
Table of Contents

11

And now, after we have caught sight of the ascetic priest , let us tackle our problem. What is the meaning of the ascetic ideal? It now first becomes serious⁠—vitally serious. We are now confronted with the real representatives of the serious . “What is the meaning of all seriousness?” This even more radical question is perchance already on the tip of our tongue: a question, fairly, for physiologists, but which we for the time being skip. In that ideal the ascetic priest finds not only his faith, but also his will, his power, his interest. His right to existence stands and falls with that ideal. What wonder that we here run up against a terrible opponent (on the supposition, of course, that we are the opponents of that ideal), an opponent fighting for his life against those who repudiate that ideal!⁠ ⁠… On the other hand, it is from the outset improbable that such a biased attitude towards our problem will do him any particular good; the ascetic priest himself will scarcely prove the happiest champion of his own ideal (on the same principle on which a woman usually fails when she wishes to champion “woman”)⁠—let alone proving the most objective critic and judge of the controversy now raised. We shall therefore⁠—so much is already obvious⁠—rather have actually to help him to defend himself properly against ourselves, than we shall have to fear being too well beaten by him. The idea, which is the subject of this dispute, is the value of our life from the standpoint of the ascetic priests: this life, then (together with the whole of which it is a part, “Nature,” “the world,” the whole sphere of becoming and passing away), is placed by them in relation to an existence of quite another character, which it excludes and to which it is opposed, unless it deny its own self: in this case, the case of an ascetic life, life is taken as a bridge to another existence. The ascetic treats life as a maze, in which one must walk backwards till one comes to the place where it starts; or he treats it as an error which one may, nay must , refute by action: for he demands that he should be followed; he

141