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nydus/The Genealogy of MoralsPublic

Three essays analyzing the origins, meaning, and value of the concepts of good, evil, and bad; of guilt, punishment, and bad conscience; and of ascetic ideals, including those of truth and truthfulness.

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Table of Contents

7

Let us beware of making dismal faces at the word “torture”⁠—there is certainly in this case enough to deduct, enough to discount⁠—there is even something to laugh at. For we must certainly not underestimate the fact that Schopenhauer, who in practice treated sexuality as a personal enemy (including its tool, woman, that “ instrumentum diaboli ”), needed enemies to keep him in a good humour; that he loved grim, bitter, blackish-green words; that he raged for the sake of raging, out of passion; that he would have grown ill, would have become a pessimist (for he was not a pessimist, however much he wished to be), without his enemies, without Hegel, woman, sensuality, and the whole “will for existence” “keeping on.” Without them Schopenhauer would not have “kept on,” that is a safe wager; he would have run away: but his enemies held him fast, his enemies always enticed him back again to existence, his wrath was just as theirs was to the ancient Cynics, his balm, his recreation, his recompense, his remedium against disgust, his happiness . So much with regard to what is most personal in the case of Schopenhauer; on the other hand, there is still much which is typical in him⁠—and only now we come back to our problem. It is an accepted and indisputable fact, so long as there are philosophers in the world and wherever philosophers have existed (from India to England, to take the opposite poles of philosophic ability), that there exists a real irritation and rancour on the part of philosophers towards sensuality. Schopenhauer is merely the most eloquent, and if one has the ear for it, also the most fascinating and enchanting outburst. There similarly exists a real philosophic bias and affection for the whole ascetic ideal; there should be no illusions on this score. Both these feelings, as has been said, belong to the type; if a philosopher lacks both of them, then he is⁠—you may be certain of it⁠—never anything but a “pseudo.” What does this mean? For this state of affairs must first be interpreted: in itself it stands

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