discovery and intelligent management of mineral resources by their very nature and infinite variety require private initiative, and that the history of government efforts in this field in this and other countries does not promise that nationalization can supply sufficient advantages to counterbalance the loss of this element. With this view the problem of nationalization becomes one of determining what steps, if any, can be taken by a government to the advantage of public welfare, which will at the same time preserve and foster private initiative, exercised with the hope of reward, which seems alone to be capable of meeting the variable, elastic, and complex problems inherent in the development of a natural resource.
A first step toward a broad scientific attack on this problem would be the recognition of the fact that tariffs, taxes, conservation, international mineral questions, leasing laws, and various technical investigations of minerals are but parts of a great unit problem. With this recognition there should follow naturally an attempt to correlate and direct the many government agencies, legislative and administrative, now concerned with different aspects of the problem. Under present conditions, the various elements of the problem are considered by different groups of persons, without sufficient contacts or correlation to promise the development of a broad, underlying policy.
Effect of Ownership Laws on Exploration
The nature and the progress of exploration (and development) in different countries have been more or less related to the character of the mining laws.
Where the mineral resource has passed from government control into private ownership, exploration is a matter of commercial arrangement between the explorer and the owner. There is often some lag in exploration, especially where the lands are held in considerable blocks. The owner is often not inclined, or unable, to institute effective exploration himself; and even though he is willing to offer favorable exploration terms to others, the inducement is often less attractive than on government lands. For instance, it is stated that in England, due to the many requirements of law and custom, it takes on an average eight years, and in some cases even longer, to close a coal lease after the terms have been agreed upon. The slowness of exploration and development on the great land grants in the United States, and on the tracts of the large timber companies, also illustrates the retarding effect of private ownership. It is partly this situation that is making governments increasingly careful about parting with mineral ownership, and that is leading to the introduction of more or less coercive measures, either to regain control or to make it easier for the public to explore and develop minerals on privately owned lands. Under the great land grants to railroads in the United States it is becoming increasingly difficult to secure mineral patents from the government; and there has been litigation between government and grantees, as in the case of certain oil lands of the Southern Pacific Railway. The taxation in some states of mineral rights which have been reserved by large owners is indirectly resulting in appraisal of these rights by the owners and in efforts to utilize them. As long as mineral rights were not taxed independently of surface rights, they were often reserved in selling surface rights on the mere chance that mineral might be found in the future, and thereby general exploration and development were held back.
In the United States, minerals on the public domain have been open to exploration and acquirement with minimum restrictions, except for the considerable areas later withdrawn from entry. After long delay a part of these withdrawn lands are again open to private exploration, but not to fee ownership. Specified minerals—coal, oil, phosphates, and potash—may be explored for, and may be leased under certain restrictions as to