recognized defects, must be applied, and the best geological effort must be directed toward reaching interpretations which come most near to meeting its intent. To refuse to lend geologic science to the aid of justice because the law was improperly framed is hardly a defensible position. Presumably it will never be possible to frame laws with such full knowledge of nature's facts as to eliminate the necessity for scientific advice in their interpretation.
It has been suggested that the courts, and not the litigants, should employ the geologists. The practical objection to this proposition lies in the difficulty encountered by the judge in the proper selection of geologists. On the assumption that the judge would select only men in whom he had confidence, it is not likely that he would override their conclusions. The outcome of the case, therefore, would be largely predetermined at the moment the selection of experts was made. It is to be doubted whether courts can have the knowledge of the scientific field and of the requirements of the situation necessary to make the wisest selection of men to interpret the given condition. The competitive element would be eliminated. From a judicial standpoint, there seems to be an equally good chance of getting at the best interpretation of the facts by listening to presentations from different standpoints, with the accompanying interplay of criticism and questioning.
Another practical objection to appointment of experts by the court is the limitation of court costs, which would make it impossible to secure the highest grade men. So far as these men are public employees, such as members of the federal or state geological surveys, this might be arranged. For others, it might be suggested that they should be willing to sacrifice their energy and time in the interests of justice; but as long as human nature and conditions are what they are, it is perhaps futile to argue this question.
If it is right to apply science to practical affairs, in other words, if the profession of economic geology is a legitimate one, it seems inevitable that the application must be in some part directed by the geologist himself, in order to avoid mistakes and confusion. The contention that the scientist must isolate himself in a rarified atmosphere to avoid contamination from a non-scientific, commercial, or legal atmosphere, seems to the writer practically untenable, if we recognize any obligation on the part of science to the practical conduct of human affairs. The fact that the geologist in making these applications may occasionally find himself in a non-scientific atmosphere may be deplored from the standpoint of maximum creativeness in science, and from this standpoint there may be reason for limitation of time given to this kind of work,—but to stay out entirely on this ground is to deny his obligation to make his science helpful to his fellows. The problem cannot be solved by staying out. It calls rather for an especial effort on the part of the scientist to establish and maintain his standards of science and ethics in the applied fields. Some doubtless fail in this effort. Others are strengthened scientifically and ethically, and contribute important aid in raising general standards. The principle of non-participation in such activities for fear of lowering scientific standards may make the geologist's problem easier, but at the expense of non-fulfillment of duties. Such a course has for its logical consequence an abandonment of the application of his science to untrained men without the ethical anchorage of scientific achievement. In short, there may be legitimate criticism of individual geologists for their methods and ethics in the applied field, and this is desirable as an aid to maintaining and improving standards; but it is not a logical step from this to the conclusion that, to avoid unfortunate incidents, economic geologists must cloister themselves and thus deny the very implication of their title.