Just as the increasing size of the units engaged in the mineral trade within national boundaries has led to discussion of the possibilities of government control in the interest of the public, so the increasing size of the units in the international mineral trade, the units in many cases being governments, is leading to discussion of the possibility of some international or supernational control in the interest of the world good. Just as national interest is the lengthened shadow of individual interest, so international interest may be regarded in some aspects as the lengthened shadow of national interest.
The general purpose of the suggested control is to minimize international friction; but more specifically it has been suggested that some sort of international coöperation is necessary in order to insure equality of opportunity among nations, both in supplies and in markets, and thereby to prevent the crowding of the weaker by the stronger nations. This is the gist of one of the famous fourteen points. The purpose might be accomplished by direct allocation of supplies or by control of tariffs and exchange.
One of the conditions which seems to require international coöperation is the exploitation of mineral deposits in backward countries. Unrestricted competition among nations in such exploitation has been an important cause of international controversy. It was planned at Peace Conference that the mineral resources in countries taken over by the great powers under mandatories should be developed and used in the interest of the group of nations, rather than for the special interest of the nation taking the mandatory. One of the natural functions of any international or supernational organization would be the adjustment and settlement of difficulties arising from this provision.
This topic brings up the question as to the right of any nation or group of nations to exert any force on weaker nations in the exploitation of mineral resources. On the principal of self-determination and of the complete freedom of action of nations, this procedure seems unjustified.
On the other hand, whether rightly or wrongly, civilization has created great material demands which must be satisfied. The individuals, companies, and governments which use force to exploit resources in weaker countries are merely the agents in supplying the demand created by all of us. While their methods are often indefensible, the exploiters cannot be regarded merely as irresponsible buccaneers who are projecting themselves unnecessarily into somebody else's business.
Whatever the sentimental and ethical aspects of the question, it seems almost inevitable that the demands of civilization will continue to require the exploitation of weaker countries; and in proportion as these countries are backward in coöperating, they must feel the world pressure.
An agreement for international coöperation in such matters, therefore, is not to be regarded as merely a cold-blooded attempt to rob weaker nations,—but rather as a means of improving methods in satisfying the actually existing material demands of civilization. For illustration, the criticism of England's attempt to develop the oil industry of Mesopotamia and Persia has to a large extent confused the methods with the aim sought for. It is the writer's view that development of these resources is inevitable, and that criticism should not be directed toward nations and groups attempting to attain these results, but rather to the methods applied.
For the purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary to go beyond the acceptance of the fact of demand, nor to argue the question as to whether the material demands of civilization should be curbed and progress restricted to matters of mind and human happiness.