aid. Digging, under inspiration or desperation, they struck fresh water within the fortress,4 and offered thanksgiving.
Communication was shortly after established between Alvarado and Cortés. Several Tlascaltecs and Cholultecs were despatched by different routes to the coast, and a courier arrived from Cempoala and gained entrance to the fort.5 Ordering Velazquez and Ordaz to abandon their mission and direct their march to Tlascala, Cortés hastened preparations to join them there. A garrison of one hundred men was left at Villa Rica, under Rodrigo Rangel, a relative of the general,6 and about thirty men remained at Cempoala to take charge of the sick and wounded, and some baggage, with orders to follow as soon as possible.
The route to the plateau lay partly through a bleak and desert country, and the inhabitants being beside less friendly than before, the army would have found it difficult to obtain supplies; but Cortés had gathered experience from his previous march, and Tlascala was entered in the middle of June.7 A hearty reception
was accorded, and more encouraging news obtained from Mexico, showing that the siege maintained its passive character. Reinforcements were nevertheless urgent, since a fresh outbreak might at any time occur. A message was again sent to gladden the garrison with promises of speedy relief.8
Including the troops under Velazquez and Ordaz the muster-roll showed about eleven hundred men, with some eighty horses, one hundred cross-bows, and eighty fire-arms, besides several cannon, and a large quantity of ammunition.9 The heart of the company, however, was the veterans of Cortés, whose superior discipline and familiarity with native warfare made them doubly reliable. Eager for a fray with the detested Aztecs, and desirous of excusing their refusal of men a month before, the Tlascaltecs offered not only supplies but large reinforcements, of which only two