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nydus/The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science, Science and MethodPublic

This collection compiles the scientific writings of Henri Poincaré, including *Science and Hypothesis*, *The Value of Science*, and *Science and Method*. The text explores the application of non-Euclidean geometry to theories of the universe and the possibility of alternative laws of nature.

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Table of Contents

PART I NUMBER AND MAGNITUDE

is the case, for example, if the first class comprehends all numbers greater than 2, and the second all numbers less than 2, and 2 itself. Here again the number 2 may be chosen as symbol of this partition.

But it may equally well happen that neither is there in the first class a number less than all the others, nor in the second class a number greater than all the others. Suppose, for example, we put in the first class all commensurable numbers whose squares are greater than 2 and in the second all whose squares are less than 2. There is none whose square is precisely 2. Evidently there is not in the first class a number less than all the others, for, however near the square of a number may be to 2, we can always find a commensurable number whose square is still closer to 2.

In Dedekind's view, the incommensurable number

√2 or (2)½

is nothing but the symbol of this particular mode of partition of commensurable numbers; and to each mode of partition corresponds thus a number, commensurable or not, which serves as its symbol.

But to be content with this would be to forget too far the origin of these symbols; it remains to explain how we have been led to attribute to them a sort of concrete existence, and, besides, does not the difficulty begin even for the fractional numbers themselves? Should we have the notion of these numbers if we had not previously known a matter that we conceive as infinitely divisible, that is to say, a continuum?

The Physical Continuum.—We ask ourselves then if the notion of the mathematical continuum is not simply drawn from experience. If it were, the raw data of experience, which are our sensations, would be susceptible of measurement. We might be tempted to believe they really are so, since in these latter days the attempt has been made to measure them and a law has even been formulated, known as Fechner's law, according to which sensation is proportional to the logarithm of the stimulus.

But if we examine more closely the experiments by which it has been sought to establish this law, we shall be led to a diametrically opposite conclusion. It has been observed, for example, that a weight A of 10 grams and a weight B of 11 grams produce identical sensations, that the weight B is just as indistinguishable from a weight C of 12 grams, but that the weight A is easily distinguished from the weight C. Thus the raw results of experience may be expressed by the following relations:

A = B,       B = C,       A < C,

which may be regarded as the formula of the physical continuum.

But here is an intolerable discord with the principle of contradiction, and the need

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