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CHAPTER XVIII. OBSERVATION.

The best arranged systems of observation, however, would fail to give us a large part of the facts which we now possess. Many processes continually going on in nature are so slow and gentle as to escape our powers of observation. Lavoisier remarked that the decomposition of water must have been constantly proceeding in nature, although its possibility was unknown till his time.‍2 No substance is wholly destitute of magnetic or diamagnetic powers; but it required all the experimental skill of Faraday to prove that iron and a few other metals had no monopoly of these powers. Accidental observation long ago impressed upon men’s minds the phenomena of lightning, and the attractive properties of amber. Experiment only could have shown that phenomena so diverse in magnitude and character were manifestations of the same agent. To observe with accuracy and convenience we must have agents under our control, so as to raise or lower their intensity, to stop or set them in action at will. Just as Smeaton found it requisite to create an artificial and governable supply of wind for his investigation of windmills, so we must have governable supplies of light, heat, electricity, muscular force, or whatever other agents we are examining.

It is hardly needful to point out too that on the earth’s surface we live under nearly constant conditions of gravity, temperature, and atmospheric pressure, so that if we are to extend our inferences to other parts of the universe where conditions are widely different, we must be prepared to imitate those conditions on a small scale here. We must have intensely high and low temperatures; we must vary the density of gases from approximate vacuum upwards; we must subject liquids and solids to pressures or strains of almost unlimited amount.

Mental Conditions of Correct Observation.

Every observation must in a certain sense be true, for the observing and recording of an event is in itself an event. But before we proceed to deal with the supposed meaning of the record, and draw inferences concerning the course of nature, we must take care to ascertain that the character and feelings of the observer are not to a great extent the phenomena recorded. The mind of man, as Francis Bacon said, is like an uneven mirror, and does not reflect the events of nature without distortion. We need hardly take notice of intentionally false observations, nor of mistakes arising from defective memory, deficient light, and so forth. Even where the utmost fidelity and care are used in observing and recording, tendencies to error exist, and fallacious opinions arise in consequence.

It is difficult to find persons who can with perfect fairness register facts for and against their own peculiar views. Among uncultivated observers the tendency to remark favourable and forget unfavourable events is so great, that no reliance can be placed upon their supposed observations. Thus arises the enduring fallacy that the changes of the weather coincide in some way with the changes of the moon, although exact and impartial registers give no countenance to the fact. The whole race of prophets and quacks live on the overwhelming effect of one success, compared with hundreds of failures which are unmentioned and forgotten. As Bacon says, “Men mark when they hit, and never mark when they miss.” And we should do well to bear in mind the ancient story, quoted by Bacon, of one who in Pagan times was shown a temple with a picture of all the persons who had been saved from shipwreck, after paying their vows. When asked whether he did not now acknowledge the power of the gods, “Ay,” he answered; “but where are they painted that were drowned after their vows?”

If indeed we could estimate the amount of bias existing in any particular observations, it might be treated like one of the forces of the problem, and the true course of external nature might still be rendered apparent. But

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