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nydus/The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science, Science and MethodPublic

This collection compiles the scientific writings of Henri Poincaré, including *Science and Hypothesis*, *The Value of Science*, and *Science and Method*. The text explores the application of non-Euclidean geometry to theories of the universe and the possibility of alternative laws of nature.

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Table of Contents

HENRI POINCARÉ

organism to whatever it is which causes the disease must be understood in case the disease is to be understood.

For this very reason, however, Virchow's theoretical principle in its most general form could be neither confirmed nor refuted by experience. It would remain empirically irrefutable, so far as I can see, even if we should learn that the devil was the true cause of all diseases. For the devil himself would then simply predetermine the veränderte Bedingungen to which the diseased organism would be reacting. Let bullets or bacteria, poisons or compressed air, or the devil be the Bedingungen to which a diseased organism reacts, the postulate that Virchow states in the passage just quoted will remain irrefutable, if only this postulate be interpreted to meet the case. For the principle in question merely says that whatever entity it may be, bullet, or poison, or devil, that affects the organism, the disease is not that entity, but is the resulting alteration in the process of the organism.

I insist, then, that this principle of Virchow's is no trial supposition, no scientific hypothesis in the narrower sense—capable of being submitted to precise empirical tests. It is, on the contrary, a very precious leading idea, a theoretical interpretation of phenomena, in the light of which observations are to be made—'a regulative principle' of research. It is equivalent to a resolution to search for those detailed connections which link the processes of disease to the normal process of the organism. Such a search undertakes to find the true unity, whatever that may prove to be, wherein the pathological and the normal processes are linked. Now without some such leading idea, the cellular pathology itself could never have been reached; because the empirical facts in question would never have been observed. Hence this principle of Virchow's was indispensable to the growth of his science. Yet it was not a verifiable and not a refutable hypothesis. One value of unverifiable and irrefutable hypotheses of this type lies, then, in the sort of empirical inquiries which they initiate, inspire, organize and guide. In these inquiries hypotheses in the narrower sense, that is, trial propositions which are to be submitted to definite empirical control, are indeed everywhere present. And the use of the other sort of principles lies wholly in their application to experience. Yet without what I have just proposed to call the 'leading ideas' of a science, that is, its principles of an unverifiable and irrefutable character, suggested, but not to be finally tested, by experience, the hypotheses in the narrower sense would lack that guidance which, as M. Poincaré has shown, the larger ideas of science give to empirical investigation.

V

I have dwelt, no doubt, at too great length upon one aspect only of our author's varied and well-balanced discussion of the problems and concepts of scientific theory. Of the hypotheses in the narrower sense and of the value of direct empirical control, he has also spoken with the authority and the originality which belong to his position. And in dealing with the foundations of mathematics he has raised one or two questions of great philosophical import into which I have no time, even if I had the right, to enter here. In particular, in speaking of the essence of mathematical reasoning, and of the difficult problem of what makes possible novel results in the field of pure mathematics, M. Poincaré defends a thesis regarding the office of 'demonstration by recurrence'—a thesis which is indeed disputable, which has been disputed and which I myself should be disposed, so far as I at present understand the matter, to modify in some respects, even in accepting the spirit of our author's assertion. Yet there can be no doubt of the importance of this thesis, and of the fact that it defines a characteristic that is indeed fundamental in a wide range of mathematical research. The philosophical problems that lie at the basis of recurrent proofs and processes are, as I have elsewhere argued, of the most fundamental importance.

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