purely analytic procedures.
If instead of showing that our theorem is true of all numbers, we only wish to show it true of the number 6, for example, it will suffice for us to establish the first 5 syllogisms of our cascade; 9 would be necessary if we wished to prove the theorem for the number 10; more would be needed for a larger number; but, however great this number might be, we should always end by reaching it, and the analytic verification would be possible.
And yet, however far we thus might go, we could never rise to the general theorem, applicable to all numbers, which alone can be the object of science. To reach this, an infinity of syllogisms would be necessary; it would be necessary to overleap an abyss that the patience of the analyst, restricted to the resources of formal logic alone, never could fill up.
I asked at the outset why one could not conceive of a mind sufficiently powerful to perceive at a glance the whole body of mathematical truths.
The answer is now easy; a chess-player is able to combine four moves, five moves, in advance, but, however extraordinary he may be, he will never prepare more than a finite number of them; if he applies his faculties