This is true, at least so far as the United States is concerned. Previous to the war, the status of many of the Jewish financial concerns in Wall Street was stronger than it is now. The war brought about a con¬ dition which threw a new light on the internationalism of Jewish finance. During the years of American neu¬ trality there was opportunity to observe the extent of the foreign affiliations of certain men, and also the extent to which ordinary national loyalty was sub¬ ordinated to the business of international finance. The war really forced a coalition of Gentile capital on one side of the struggle, as against certain blocks of Jewish capital which were willing to play both sides. The old Rothschild maxim, “Do not put all your eggs in one basket,” becomes perfectly plain when trans¬ posed into national and international terms. Jewish finance treats political parties the same—bets on them both, and so never loses. In the same way, Jewish finance never loses a war. Being on both sides, it can¬ not miss the winning side, and its terms of peace are sufficient to cover all advances to the side that lost. This was the significance of the great swarming of Jews at the Peace Conference.
Many of the Jewish houses on Wall Street were originally the American branches of long established houses