Two high authorities in physical science (v. Herschel, Nat. Phil., art. 192; Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, vol. ii. p. 243) pronounce these instances of little service in the task of induction, being for the most part classed not according to the ideas which they involve, or to any obvious circumstance in the facts of which they consist, but according to the extent and manner of their influence upon the inquiry in which they are employed. Thus we have solitary instances, migrating instances, ostensive instances, clandestine instances, so termed according to the degree in which they exhibit, or seem to exhibit, the property, whose nature we would examine. We have guide-post instances, crucial instances, instances of the parted road, of the doorway, of the lamp, according to the guidance they supply to our advance. Whewell remarks that such a classification is much of the same nature as if, having to teach the art of building, we were to describe tools with reference to the amount and place of the work which they must do, instead of pointing out their construction and use; as if we were to inform the pupil that we must have tools for lifting a stone up, tools for moving it sidewise, tools for laying it square, and tools for cementing it firmly. The means are thus lost in the end, and we reap the fruits of unmethodical arrangement in the confusion of cross division. In addition, all the instances are leavened with the error of confounding the laws with the causes of phenomena, and we are urged to adopt the fundamental error of seeking therein the universal agents, or general causes of phenomena, without ascending the gradual steps of intermediate laws.—Ed.
and Seneca, in the third book of his Natural Philosophy, quest. iv., states the opinion in more precise language than either the ancient bard or the modern philosopher.—Ed.
But there is a species of collective instance which Bacon does not seem to have contemplated, in which particular phenomena are presented in such