(Note on the proportion of the sexes.)
CHAPTER XI.
MATERIAL AND FORMAL LOGIC.
§§ 1, 2. Broad distinction between these views;
2, 3. Difficulty of adhering consistently to the objective view;
4. Especially in the case of Hypotheses.
5. The doubtful stage of our facts is only occasional in Inductive Logic.
6–9. But normal and permanent in Probability.
10, 11. Consequent difficulty of avoiding Conceptualist phraseology.
CHAPTER XII.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISTINCTIONS OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER.
§§ 1, 2. Probability has no relation to time.
3, 4. Butler and Mill on Probability before and after the event.
5. Other attempts at explaining the difficulty.
6–8. What is really meant by the distinction.
9. Origin of the common mistake.
10–12. Examples in illustration of this view,
13. Is Probability relative?
14. What is really meant by this expression.
15. Objections to terming Probability relative.
16, 17. In suitable examples the difficulty scarcely presents itself.
CHAPTER XIII.
ON MODALITY.
§ 1. Various senses of Modality;
2. Having mostly some relation to Probability.