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nydus/The Logic of Chance, 3rd EditionPublic
Page 297 of 310
Table of Contents

THE THEORY OF THE AVERAGE AS A MEANS OF APPROXIMATION TO THE TRUTH.

was absolutely essential that the work should be true to the tenth of an inch for it to be of any use. But conceive also that two specifications had been sent, resting on different measurements, in one of which the length of the requisite piece was described as sixty and in the other sixty-one inches. On the assumption of any ordinary law of error, whether of the binomial type or not, there can be no doubt that the firm would make the best of a very bad job by constructing a piece of 60 inches and a half: i.e.[** TN: space] they would have a better chance of being within the requisite tenth of an inch by so doing, than by taking either of the two specifications at random and constructing it accurately to this. But if the law were of the kind indicated in our diagram,[11] then it seems equally certain that they would be less likely to be within the requisite narrow margin by so doing. As a mere question of probability,—that is, if such estimates were acted upon again and again,—there would be fewer failures encountered by simply choosing one of the conflicting measurements at random and working exactly to this, than by trusting to the average of the

This suggests some further reflections as to the taking of averages. We will turn now to another exceptional case, but one involving somewhat different considerations than those which have been just discussed. As before, it may be most conveniently introduced by commencing with an example.

§ 32. Suppose then that two scouts were sent to take the calibre of a gun in a hostile fort,—we may conceive that the fort was to be occupied next day, and used against the enemy, and that it was important to have a supply of shot or shell,—and that the result is that one of them reports the calibre to be 8 inches and the other 9. Would it be wise to assume that the mean of these two, viz.[** TN: space] 81/2 inches, was a likelier value than either separately?

The answer seems to be this. If we have reason to suppose that the possible calibres partake of the nature of a continuous magnitude,—i.e.[ TN: space] that all values, with certain limits, are to be considered as admissible, (an assumption which we always make in our ordinary inverse step from an observation or magnitude to the thing observed or measured)—then we should be justified in selecting the average as the likelier value. But if, on the other hand, we had reason to suppose that whole inches are always or generally preferred, as is in fact the case now with heavy guns, we should do better to take, even at hazard, one of the two estimates set before us, and trust this alone instead of taking an average of the two.

§ 33. The principle upon which we act here may be stated thus. Just as in the direct process of calculating or displaying the ‘errors’, whether in an algebraic formula or in a diagram, we generally assume that their possibility is continuous, i.e.[** TN: space] that all intermediate values are possible; so, in the inverse process of determining the probable position of the original from the known value of two or more errors, we assume that that position is capable of falling at any point whatever between certain limits. In such an example as the above, where we know or suspect a discontinuity of that possibility of position, the value of the average may be entirely destroyed.

In the above example we were supposed to know that the calibre of the guns was likely to run in English inches or in some other recognized units. But if the battery were in China or Japan, and we knew nothing of the standards of length in use there, we could no longer appeal to this principle. It is doubtless highly probable that those calibres are not of the nature of continuously varying magnitudes; but in an entire ignorance of the standards actually adopted, we are to all intents and purposes in the same position as if they were of that continuous nature. When this is so the objections to trusting to the average would no longer hold good, and if we had only one opportunity, or a very few opportunities, we should do best to adhere to the customary practice.

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