for whom we are working. That is to say, it will depend on the method of exposition; it would take up too much space to give the theory of it.
II. When we come to the selection of historical facts for classification and arrangement, a question is raised which has been disputed with considerable warmth.
Every human action is by its nature an individual transient phenomenon which is confined to a definite time and a definite place. Strictly speaking, every fact is unique. But every action of a man resembles other actions of the same man, or of other members of the same group, and often to so great a degree that the whole group of actions receives a common name, in which their individuality is lost. These groups of similar actions, which the human mind is irresistibly impelled to form, are called habits, usages, institutions. These are merely constructions of the mind, but they are imposed so forcibly on our intellect that many of them must be recognised and constantly employed; habits are collective facts, possessing extension in time and space. Historical facts may therefore be considered under two different aspects: we may regard either the individual, particular, and transient elements in them, or we may look for what is collective, general, and durable. According to the first conception, history is a continuous narrative of the incidents which have happened among men in the past; according to the second, it is the picture of the successive habits of humanity.
On this subject there has been a contest, especially in Germany, between the partisans of the history of civilisation (Kulturgeschichte) and the historians who remain faithful to ancient tradition; in France we have had the struggle between