While then the worst man is he who displays vice both in his own affairs and in his dealings with his friends, the best man is not he who displays virtue in his own affairs merely, but he who displays virtue towards others; for this is the hard thing to do.

Justice, then, in this sense of the word, is not a part of virtue, but the whole of it; and the injustice which is opposed to it is not a part of vice, but the whole of it.

How virtue differs from justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; it is one and the same character differently viewed: 94 viewed in relation to others, this character is justice; viewed simply as a certain character, 95 it is virtue.

We have now to examine justice in that sense in which it is a part of virtue⁠—for we maintain that there is such a justice⁠—and also the corresponding kind of injustice.