Now, when you have on the one side the universal judgment forbidding you to taste, and on the other side the universal judgment, “all sweet things are pleasant,” 181 with the corresponding particular, “this thing before me is sweet” (but it is the particular judgment which is effective), and appetite is present⁠—then, though the former train of reasoning bids you avoid this, appetite moves you [to take it]; for appetite is able to put the several bodily organs in motion.

And thus it appears that it is in a way under the influence of reason, that is to say of opinion, that people act incontinently⁠—opinion, too, that is, not in itself, but only accidentally, opposed to right reason. For it is the desire, not the opinion, that is opposed to right reason. 182

And this is the reason why brutes cannot be incontinent; they have no universal judgments, but only images and memories of particular facts.