S.

the harmony or accord of the different elements, when the dictates of reason are enforced by passion against the appetites, while vice is the anarchy or discord of the soul when passion and appetite join in rebellion against reason (cp. 4. 444; 10. 609 foll.; Soph. 228; Pol. 296 D; Laws 10. 906 C]. —Regarded from the intellectual side the soul is analysed into four faculties, reason, understanding, faith, knowledge of shadows. These severally correspond to the four divisions of knowledge (6. 511 E), two for intellect and two for opinion; and thus arises the Platonic ‘proportion,’—being : becoming :: intellect : opinion, and science : belief :: understanding : knowledge of shadows. These divisions are partly real, partly formed by a logical process, which, as in so many distinctions of ancient philosophers, has outrun fact, and are further illustrated and explained by the allegory of the cave in Book VII (see Introduction, p. xciv). —The pre-existence and the immortality of the soul are assumed. The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις or ‘remembrance of a previous birth’ is not so much dwelt upon as in the Meno, Phaedo, or Phaedrus, neither is it made a proof of immortality (Meno 86; Phaedo 73). It is apparently alluded to in the story of Er, where we are told that ‘the pilgrims drank the waters of Unmindfulness; the foolish took too deep a draught, but the wise were more moderate’ (10. 621 A). In the Xth Book Glaucon is supposed to receive with amazement Socrates’ confident assertion of immortality, although a previous allusion to another state of existence has passed unheeded (6. 498 D); and in earlier parts of the discussion (e.g. 2. 362; 3. 386), the censure which is passed on the common representations of Hades implies in itself some belief in a future life [cp. Introduction to Phaedo, Vol. I]. The argument for the immortality of the soul is not drawn out at great length or with the emphasis of the Phaedo. It is chiefly of a verbal character:—All things which perish are destroyed by some inherent evil; but the soul is not destroyed by sin, which is the evil proper to her, and must therefore be immortal (cp. Introd. p. clxvi). —The condition of the soul after death is represented by Plato in his favourite form of a myth [cp. Meno 81; Phaedo 88; Gorg. 522]. The