in the way of a sketch of what takes place in a case of coalition of industrial corporations on a large scale such as recent industrial history has made familiar.
The avowed end of these latter-day husiness coalitions is economy of production and sale and an amicable regulation of intercorporate relations. So far as hears on the functioning of credit in the attendant business transactions, the presence or absence of these purposes, of course, does not affect the course of events or the outcome. These avowed incentives do not touch the credit operar tious involved. On the other hand, the need of large credit in consummating the deal, as well as the presumptive gains to be drawn from the credit relations involved, offer inducements of their own to men who are in a position to effect such a coalition. Inducements of this kind seem to have been of notable effect in bringing on some of the recent operations of this class.
Credit operations come into these transactions mainly at two points: in the "financing" of the deal, and in the augmentation of debentures ; and at both of these points there is a chance of gain — on the one hand to the promoter (organizer) and the credit house which Bnances the operation, and on the other hand to the stockholders. The gain which accrues to the two former is the more unequivocal, and this seems in some cases to be the