argument de jure, not de facto, and the training given lends facility and certainty in the pursuit of de jure distinctions and generalizations, rather than in the pursuit or the assimilation oi a, de facto knowledge of impersonal phenomena. The end of Buch reasoning is the interpretation of new facts in terms of accredited precedents, rather than a revision of the knowledge drawn from past experience in the matter-of-fact light of new phenomena. The endeavor is to make facts conform to law, I not to make the law or general rule conform to facts. The bent bo given favors the acceptance of the general, abstract, custom-made rule aa something real with a reality superior to the reality of impersonal, non-conventional facts. Such training gives reach and subtlety in metaphysical argu-
ment and in what is known as the "practical" management of affairs ; it gives executive or administrative efficiency, so-called, as distinguished from mechanical work. "Practical" efficiency