upset or block the industrial process at some one or more points. His strategy is commonly directed ' against other business interests and his ends are
' Ct. toatJinony of J. B. Dill, RepnTt of the Industrial CommUtlon, Tol. I.lip. 10T8,10S0-1085 i" Digest of Evidence," p. 77; &laoleatimoD7 of vartoiu wllneaBea on stock speculation imd corporate maDagemeot, aud particularl; the special report to the Commiuloa, on " Securities of Industrial CumbinatlooB and Railroads," vol XIIL, especiallj pp. 990-938.
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I commonly accompliahed by the help of some form I of pecuniary coercion. This is not uniformly true, but it seems to be true in appreciably more than half of the transactions in question. In general, transactions which aim to bring a coalition of industrial plants or processes under the control of a given business man are directed to making it difficult for the plants or processes in question to be carried on in severalty by their previous owners or managers.' It is commonly a struggle between rival business men, and more often than not the outcome of the struggle depends on which side can inflict or endure the greater pecuniary damage. And pecuniary damage in such a case not uncommonly involves a set-back to the industrial plants concerned and a derangement, more or less extensive, of the industrial system at large.
The work of the greater modem business men, in 80 far as they have to do with the ordering of the scheme of industrial life, is of this strategic character. The dLspositions which they make are