CodalSearch this book — or all of Codal…⌘K
nydus/Applied EugenicsPublic
Page 288 of 746
Table of Contents

CHAPTER X

Such coercive restriction does, in some cases, sacrifice what may be considered personal rights. In such instances, personal rights must give way before the immensely greater interests of the race. But there is a much larger class of cases, where coercion can not be approved, and yet where an enlightened conscience, or the subtle force of public opinion, may well bring about some measure of restraint on reproduction. This class includes many individuals who are not in any direct way detrimental to society; and who yet have some inherited taint or defect that should be checked, and of which they, if enlightened, would probably be the first to desire the elimination. The number of high-minded persons who deliberately refrain from marriage, or parenthood, in the interests of posterity, is greater than any one imagines, except a eugenist brought into intimate relations with people who take an intelligent interest in the subject.

X. comes, let us say, from a family in which there is a persistent taint of epilepsy, or insanity. X. is a normal, useful, conscientious member of society. To talk of segregating such an individual would be rash. But X. has given some thought to heredity and eugenics, and decides that he, or she, will refrain from marriage, in order to avoid transmitting the family taint to another generation. Here we have, in effect, a non-coercive restriction of reproduction. What shall we say of the action of X. in remaining celibate,—is it wise or unwise? To be encouraged or condemned?

It is perhaps the most delicate problem which applied eugenics offers. It is a peculiarly personal one, and the outsider who advises in such a case is assuming a heavy responsibility, not only in regard to the future welfare of the race, but to the individual happiness of X. We can not accept the sweeping generalization sometimes made that "Strength should marry weakness and weakness marry strength." No more can we hold fast to the ideal, which we believe to be utopian, that "Strength should only marry strength." There are cases where such glittering generalities are futile;

288