betterment would ultimately defeat its own end by making race betterment impossible.
But race betterment will also be impossible unless a clear distinction is made between measures that really mean race betterment of a fundamental and permanent nature, and measures which do not.
We have chosen the Infant Mortality Movement for analysis in this chapter because it is an excellent example of the kind of social betterment which is taken for granted, by most of its proponents, to be a fundamental piece of race betterment; but which, as a fact, often means race impairment. No matter how abundant and urgent are the reasons for continuing to reduce infant mortality wherever possible, it is dangerous to close the eyes to the fact that the gain from it is of a kind that must be paid for in other ways; that to carry on the movement without adding eugenics to it will be a short-sighted policy, which increases the present happiness of the world at the cost of diminishing the happiness of posterity through the perpetuation of inferior strains.
While some euthenic measures are eugenically evils, even if necessary ones, it must not be inferred that all euthenic measures are dysgenic. Many of them, such as the economic and social changes we have suggested in earlier chapters, are an important part of eugenics. Every euthenic measure should be scrutinized from the evolutionary standpoint; if it is eugenic as well as euthenic, it should be whole-heartedly favored; if it is dysgenic but euthenic it should be condemned or adopted, according to whether or not the gain in all ways from its operation will exceed the damage.
In general, euthenics, when not accompanied by some form of selection (i. e., eugenics) ultimately defeats its own end. If it is accompanied by rational selection, it can usually be