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nydus/The Logic of Chance, 3rd EditionPublic

This work examines the physical foundations of probability by analyzing the formation and behavior of statistical series. It explores the nature of laws of error, the processes of causation, and the empirical methods required to establish and prove probabilistic data.

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Table of Contents

THE SUBJECTIVE SIDE OF PROBABILITY. MEASUREMENT OF BELIEF.

I.[** TN: space] § 13), that it was in the case of the latter only that strict scientific inferences could be made. For how can we have a ‘limit’ in the case of those series which ultimately exhibit irregular fluctuations? When we say, for instance, that it is an even chance that a given person recovers from the cholera, the meaning of this assertion is that in the long run one half of the persons attacked by that disease do recover. But if we examined a sufficiently extensive range of statistics, we might find that the manners and customs of society had produced such a change in the type of the disease or its treatment, that we were no nearer approaching towards a fixed limit than we were at first. The conception of an ultimate limit in the ratio between the numbers of the two classes in the series necessarily involves an absolute fixity of the type. When therefore nature does not present us with this absolute fixity, as she seldom or never does except in games of chance (and not demonstrably there), our only resource is to introduce such a series, in other words, as has so often been said, to substitute a series of the right

§ 37. The above, which may be considered tolerably complete as a definition, might equally well have been given in the last chapter. It has been deferred however to the present place, in order to connect with it at once a proposition involving the conceptions introduced in this chapter; viz.[** TN: space] the state of our own minds, in reference to the amount of belief we entertain in contemplating any one of the events whose probability has just been described. Reasons were given against the opinion that our belief admitted of any exact apportionment like the numerical one just mentioned. Still, it was shown that a reasonable explanation could be given of such an expression as, ‘my belief is 1/10th of certainty’, though it was an explanation which pointed unmistakeably to a series of events, and ceased to be intelligible, or at any rate justifiable, when it was not viewed in such a relation to a series. In so far, then,

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