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nydus/The Logic of Chance, 3rd EditionPublic

This work examines the physical foundations of probability by analyzing the formation and behavior of statistical series. It explores the nature of laws of error, the processes of causation, and the empirical methods required to establish and prove probabilistic data.

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Table of Contents

CHANCE AS OPPOSED TO CAUSATION AND DESIGN.

correspond to a distinction of some practical importance. We call a coincidence casual, I apprehend, when we mean to imply that no knowledge of one of the two elements, which we can suppose to be practically attainable, would enable us to expect the other. We know of no generalization which covers them both, except of course such as are taken for granted to be inoperative. In such an application it seems that the word ‘casual’ is not used in antithesis to ‘causal’ or to ‘designed’, but rather to that broader conception of order or regularity to which I should apply the term Uniformity. The casual coincidence is one which we cannot bring under any special generalization; certain, probable, or even plausible.

A slightly different way of expressing this distinction is to regard these ‘mere coincidences’ as being simply cases in point of independent events, in the sense in which independence was described in a former chapter. We saw that any two events, A and B, were so described when each happens with precisely the same relative statistical frequency whether the other happens or not. This state of things seems to hold good of the successions of heads and tails in tossing coins, as in that of male and female births in a town, or that of the digits in many mathematical tables. Thus we suppose that when men are picked up in the street and taken into a house to die, there will not be in the long run any preferential selection for or against the house in which they were born. And all that we necessarily mean to claim when we deny of such an occurrence, in any particular case, that it is a mere coincidence, is that that particular case must be taken out of the common list and transferred to one in which there is some such preferential selection.

§ 11. III. The next problem is a somewhat more intricate one, and will therefore require rather careful subdivision. It involves the antithesis between Chance and Design. That is, we are not now (as in the preceding case) considering objects in their physical aspect alone, and taking account only of the relative frequency of their co-existence or sequence; but we are considering the agency by which they are produced, and we are enquiring whether that agency

trusted to what we call chance, or whether it employed what we call design.

The reader must clearly understand that we are not now discussing the mere question of fact whether a certain assigned arrangement is what we call a chance one. This, as was fully pointed out in the fourth chapter, can be settled by mere inspection, provided the materials are extensive enough. What we are now proposing to do is to carry on the enquiry from the point at which we then had to leave it off, by solving the question, Given a certain arrangement, is it more likely that this was produced by design, or by some of the methods commonly called chance methods? The distinction will be obvious if we revert to the succession of figures which constitute the ratio π. As I have said, this arrangement, regarded as a mere succession of digits, appears to fulfil perfectly the characteristics of a chance arrangement. If we were to omit the first four or five digits, which are familiar to most of us, we might safely defy any one to whom it was shown to say that it was not got at by simply drawing figures from a bag. He might look at it for his whole life without detecting that it was anything but the result of such a chance selection. And rightly so, because regarded as a mere arrangement it is a chance one: it fulfils all the requirements of such an arrangement.[2] The question

we are now proceeding to discuss is this: Given any such arrangement how are we to determine the process by which it was arrived at?

We are supposed to have some event before us which might have been produced in either of two alternative ways, i.e.[** TN: space] by chance or by some kind of deliberate design; and we are asked to determine the odds in favour of one or other of these alternatives. It is therefore a problem in Inverse Probability and is liable to all the difficulties to which problems of this class are apt to be exposed.

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