prospect of a continuance of wet weather, and therefore take the second. Or if, finally, we knew that rain came in long spells or seasons, as in the tropics, then the occurrence of ten wet days in succession would make us believe that we had entered on one of these seasons, and that therefore the next day would probably resemble the preceding ten.
Since then all these forms of such an Inductive rule are possible, and we have often no à priori grounds for preferring one to another, it would seem to be unreasonable to attempt to establish any universal formula of anticipation. All that we can do is to ascertain what are the circumstances under which one or other of these rules is, as a matter of fact, found to be applicable, and to make use of it under those circumstances.
§ 31. (VII.) In the cases discussed in (V.)[** TN: space] the almost infinitely small chances with which we were concerned were
rightly neglected from all practical consideration, however proper it might be, on speculative grounds, to keep our minds open to their actual existence. But it has often occurred to me that there is a common error in neglecting to take them into account when they may, though individually small, make up for their minuteness by their number. As the mathematician would express it, they may occasionally be capable of being integrated into a finite or even considerable magnitude.
For instance, we may be confronted with a difficulty out of which there appears to be only one appreciably possible mode of escape. The attempt is made to force us into accepting this, however great the odds apparently are against it, on the ground that improbable as it may seem, it is at any rate vastly more probable than any of the others. I can quite admit that, on practical grounds, we may often find it reasonable to adopt this course; for we can only act on one supposition, and we naturally and rightly choose, out of a quantity of improbabilities, the least improbable. But when we are not forced to act, no such decisive preference is demanded of us. It is then perfectly reasonable to refuse assent to the proposed explanation; even to say distinctly that we do not believe it, and at the same time to decline, at present, to accept any other explanation. We remain, in fact, in a state of suspense of judgment, a state perfectly right and reasonable so long as no action demanding a specific choice is forced upon us. One alternative may be decidedly probable as compared with any other individually, but decidedly improbable as compared with all others collectively. This in itself is intelligible enough; what people often fail to see is that there is no necessary contradiction between saying and feeling this, and yet being prepared vigorously to act, when action is forced upon us, as though this alternative were really the true one.
§ 32. To take a specific instance, this way of regarding the matter has often occurred to me in disputes upon ‘Spiritualist’ manifestations. Assent is urged upon us because, it is said, no other possible solution can be suggested. It may be quite true that apparently overwhelming difficulties may lie as against each separate alternative solution; but is it always sufficiently realized how numerous such solutions may be? No matter that each individually may be almost incredible: they ought all to be massed together and thrown into the scale against the proffered solution, when the only question asked is, Are we to accept this solution? There is no unfairness in such a course. We are perfectly ready to adopt the same plan against any other individual alternative, whenever any person takes to claiming this as the solution of the difficulty. We are looking at the matter from a purely logical point of view, and are quite willing, so far, to place every solution, spiritualist or otherwise, upon the same footing. The partisans of every alternative are in somewhat the same position as the members of a deliberative assembly, in which no one will support the motion of any other member. Every