§ 15. If the reader will study the following example, one well known to mathematicians under the name of the Petersburg[5] problem, he will find that it serves to illustrate several of the considerations mentioned in this chapter. It serves especially to bring out the facts that the series with which we are concerned must be regarded as indefinitely extensive in point of number or duration; and that when so regarded certain series, but certain series only (the one in question being a case in point), take advantage of the indefinite range to keep on producing individuals in it whose deviation from the previous average has no finite limit whatever. When rightly viewed it is a very simple problem, but it has given rise, at one time or another, to a good deal of confusion and perplexity.
The problem may be stated thus:—a penny is tossed up; if it gives head I receive one pound; if heads twice running two pounds; if heads three times running four pounds, and so on; the amount to be received doubling every time that a fresh head succeeds. That is, I am to go on as long as it continues to give a succession of heads, to regard this succession as a ‘turn’ or set, and then take another turn, and so on; and for each such turn I am to receive a payment; the occurrence of tail being understood to yield nothing, in fact being omitted from our consideration. However many times head may be given in succession, the number of pounds I may claim is found by raising two to a power one less
than that number of times. Here then is a series formed by a succession of throws. We will assume,—what many persons will consider to admit of demonstration, and what certainly experience confirms within considerable limits,—that the rarity of these ‘runs’ of the same face is in direct proportion to the amount I receive for them when they do occur. In other words, if we regard only the occasions on which I receive payments, we shall find that every other time I get one pound, once in four times I get two pounds, once in eight times four pounds, and so on without any end. The question is then asked, what ought I to pay for this privilege? At the risk of a slight anticipation of the results of a subsequent chapter, we may assume that this is equivalent to asking, what amount paid each time would on the average leave me neither winner nor loser? In other words, what is the average amount I should receive on the above terms? Theory pronounces that I ought to give an infinite sum: that is, no finite sum, however great, would be an adequate equivalent. And this is really quite intelligible. There is a series of indefinite length before me, and the longer I continue to work it the richer are my returns, and this without any limit whatever. It is true that the very rich hauls are extremely rare, but still they do come, and when they come they make it up by their greater richness. On every occasion on which people have devoted themselves to the pursuit in question, they made acquaintance, of course, with but a limited portion of this series; but the series on which we base our calculation is unlimited; and the inferences usually drawn as to the sum which ought in the long run to be paid for the privilege in question are in perfect accordance with this supposition.
The common form of objection is given in the reply, that so far from paying an infinite sum, no sensible man would give anything approaching to £50 for such a chance. Probably not, because no man would see enough of the series to make it worth his while. What most persons form their practical opinion upon, is such small portions of the series as they have actually seen or can reasonably expect. Now in any such portion, say