and he tells me that it was numbered 25, what are the odds that he is right? Proceeding as before, in 10,000 drawings this ball would be obtained 10 times, and correctly named 9 times. But on the 9990 occasions on which it was not drawn there would be a difference, for the witness has now many openings for error before him. It is, however, generally considered reasonable to assume that his errors will all take the form of announcing wrong numbers; and that, there being no apparent reason why he should choose one number rather than another, he will be likely to announce all the wrong ones equally often. Hence his 999 errors, instead of all leading him now back again to one spot, will be uniformly spread over as many distinct ways of going wrong. On one only of these occasions, therefore, will he mention 25 as having been drawn. It follows therefore that out of every 10 times that he names 25 he is right 9 times; so that in this case his average or general truthfulness applies equally well to the special case in point.
§ 8. With regard to the truth of these conclusions, it must of course be admitted that if we grant the validity of the assumptions about the limits within which the blundering or mendacity of the witness are confined, and the complete impartiality with which his answers are disposed within those limits, the reasoning is perfectly sound. But are not these assumptions extremely arbitrary, that is, are not our lotteries and bags of balls rendered perfectly precise in many respects in which, in ordinary life, the conditions supposed to correspond to them are so vague and uncertain that no such method of reasoning becomes practically available? Suppose
that a person whom I have long known, and of whose measure of veracity and judgment I may be supposed therefore to have acquired some knowledge, informs me that there is something to my advantage if I choose to go to certain trouble or expense in order to secure it. As regards the general veracity of the witness, then, there is no difficulty; we suppose that this is determined for us. But as regards his story, difficulty and vagueness emerge at every point. What is the number of balls in the bag here? What in fact are the nature and contents of the bag out of which we suppose the drawing to have been made? It does not seem that the materials for any rational judgment exist here. But if we are to get at any such amended figure of veracity as those attained in the above example, these questions must necessarily be answered with some degree of accuracy; for the main point of the method consists in determining how often the event must be considered not to happen, and thence inferring how often the witness will be led wrongly to assert that it has happened.
It is not of course denied that considerations of the kind in question have some influence upon our decision, but only that this influence could under any ordinary circumstances be submitted to numerical determination. We are doubtless liable to have information given to us that we have come in for some kind of fortune, for instance, when no such good luck has really befallen us; and this not once only but repeatedly. But who can give the faintest intimation of the nature and number of the occasions on which, a blank being thus really drawn, a prize will nevertheless be falsely announced? It appears to me therefore that numerical results of any practical value can seldom, if ever, be looked for from this method of procedure.
§ 9. Our conclusion in the case of the lottery, or, what comes to the same thing, in the case of the bag with black and white balls, has been questioned or objected to[4] on the ground that it is contrary to all experience to suppose that the testimony of a moderately good witness could be so enormously depreciated under such circumstances. I should prefer to base the objection on the ground that experience scarcely ever presents such circumstances as those supposed; but if we postulate their existence the given conclusion seems correct enough. Assume that a man is merely required to