be in possession of the opposite side of the river, at least partially. The Duke, therefore, determined to wait behind the Saale to see what would happen, that is to say, if we can call anything a determination which emanated from this many-headed Headquarters’ Staff, and in this time of confusion and utter indecision.
Whatever may have been the true condition of affairs during this state of expectation, the consequent situation of the army was this:—
- That the enemy might be attacked if he crossed the Saale to attack the Prussian army.
- That if he did not march against that army, operations might be commenced against his communications.
- If it should be found practicable and advisable, he might be intercepted near Leipsic by a rapid flank march.
In the first case, the Prussian army possessed a great strategic and tactical advantage in the deep valley of the Saale. In the second, the strategic advantage was just as great, for the enemy had only a very narrow base between our position and the neutral territory of Bohemia, whilst ours was extremely broad; even in the third case, our army, covered by the Saale, was still by no means in a disadvantageous situation. All these three measures, in spite of the confusion and want of any clear perception at head-quarters, were really discussed; but certainly we cannot wonder that, although a right idea may have been entertained, it should have entirely failed in the execution by the complete want of resolution and the confusion generally prevailing.
In the two first cases, the position on the left bank of the Saale is to be regarded as a real flank position, and it had undoubtedly as such very great qualities; but in truth, against a very superior enemy, against a Buonaparte, a flank position with an army that is not very sure about what it is doing, is a very bold measure.