If we look closely into the foundation of the conception of the so-called methodical offensive war, we shall find it generally consists of the following things:—
- Conquest of those fortresses belonging to the enemy which we meet with.
- Laying in the necessary supplies.
- Fortifying important points, as, magazines, bridges, positions, etc.
- Resting the troops in quarters during winter, or when they require to be recruited in health and refreshed.
- Waiting for the reinforcements of the ensuing year.
If for the attainment of all these objects we make a formal division in the course of the offensive action, a resting point in the movement, it is supposed that we gain a new base and renewed force, as if our own State was following up in the rear of the army, and that the latter laid in renewed vigour for every fresh campaign.
All these praiseworthy motives may make the offensive war more convenient, but they do not make its results surer, and are generally only make-believes to cover certain counteracting forces, such as the feelings of the commander or irresolution in the cabinet. We shall try to roll them up from the left flank.
- The waiting for reinforcements suits the enemy just as well, and is, we may say, more to his advantage. Besides, it lies in the nature of the thing that a State can place in line nearly as many combatant forces in one year as in two; for all the actual increase of combatant force in the second year is but trifling in relation to the whole.
- The enemy rests himself at the same time that we do.