Leucippus, Democritus, and especially Lucretius, in the classical ages, represented matter as made up of atoms—that is, of parts incapable of further division. The geometrical impossibility of such an admission, as well as the conclusions which were deduced by the ancient atomists from their fundamental propositions, prevented other philosophers from following them, and the atomic doctrine, like very many others, lived, without being ratified by fact, in the imaginations of its followers. Between the present atomic theory and the doctrine of the above-named ancient philosophers there is naturally a remote historical connection, as between the doctrine of Pythagoras and Copernicus, but they are essentially different. For us the atom is indivisible, not in the geometrical abstract sense, but only in a physical and chemical sense. It would be better to call the atoms indivisible individuals. The Greek atom = the Latin individual, both according to the etymology and original sense of the words, but in course of time these two words have acquired a different meaning. The individual is mechanically and geometrically divisible, and only indivisible in a special sense. The earth, the sun, a man or a fly are individuals, although geometrically divisible.
Thus the ‘atoms’ of contemporary science, indivisible in a chemical sense, form those units with which we are concerned in the investigation of the natural phenomena of matter, just as a man is an indivisible unit in the investigation of social relations, or as the stars, planets, and luminaries serve as units in astronomy. The formation of the vortex hypothesis, in which, as we shall afterwards see, atoms are entire whirls mechanically complex, although physico-chemically indivisible, clearly shows that the scientific men of our time in holding to the atomic theory have only borrowed the word and form of expression from the ancient philosophers, and not the essence of their atomic doctrine. It is erroneous to imagine that the contemporary conceptions of the atomists are nothing but the repetition of the metaphysical reasonings of the ancients. To show the true meaning of the atomism of the ancient philosophers, and the profound difference between their points of argument and those of contemporary men of science, I cite the following fundamental propositions of Democritus (B.C. 470–380) as the best expounder of the atomic doctrine of the ancients:—(1) Nothing can proceed from nothing, nothing that exists can disappear or be destroyed (and hence matter), and every change only consists of a combination or separation.