Moreover, in order to prevent the power of France from becoming too great, the only policy possible to England was participation in France’s lust for aggres¬ sion. In fact, England had failed to achieve what she was aiming at when she went to war. The rise of a European Power above and beyond the ratio of strength in the continental State system of Europe had not been prevented ; it had, in fact, been solidly established.
France’s position to-day is unique. She is the first Power, in a military sense, with no serious rival on the Continent ; her frontiers are practically safe against Italy and Spain ; she is protected against Germany by her army, which is the most powerful in the world, and by the Fatherland’s powerlessness, her long stretch of coast is safe against attack by reason of her navy, which is growing stronger than that of the British Empire.
Great Britain’s permanent desire is to maintain a certain balance of power between the States of Europe amongst themselves, since that appears to be a neces¬ sary condition for British influence in the world.
France’s permanent desire was to prevent Germany from becoming a solid Power, to maintain a system of small States in Germany, more or less equal to each other in power and without unified leadership. She wished to hold the left bank of the Rhine as a guarantee for building up and securing her hegemony in Europe.
The final aim of French diplomacy is in contra¬ diction to the final tendencies of British statesman ship.
There does not exist any British, American or Italian statesman who could ever be designated as “pro-German”. Every Englishman, in his capacity as a statesman, is British first of all, and the same with every American. And no Italian would be prepared to further any policy other than pro-Italian. Anyone, therefore, who expects to build up alliances with foreign nations, relying on pro-Germanism amongst statesmen of other countries, is either an ass or no true statesman.