Germany did indeed collapse with lightning sud¬ denness in November, 1918. But, whilst the cata¬ strophe was happening at home, the armies were still deep in the enemy countries. France’s first care was, at that time, not the disintegration of Germany, but rather how to get the German armies as quickly as possible out of France and Belgium. Thus the first task of the leaders in Paris in finishing up the War was to disarm the German armies and force them back into Germany if possible ; not till that was accom¬ plished could they devote attention to attaining their own original war aim. For England, the War was really won when Germany was destroyed as a colonial and commercial Power, and was reduced to becoming a State of secondary importance. She had no interest in blotting out the German State altogether ; in fact, she had every reason to desire a future rival against France in Europe. Thus France had to wait for peace before setting out on the work for which the War had laid the foundation, and Clemenceau’s declaration that for him the Peace was merely a continuation of the War, acquired additional significance.
France’s intentions must have been known by the winter of 1922-23.
In December, 1922, the situation between Germany and France appeared to have become threatening again. France was contemplating vast new measures of oppression, and needed sanctions for her action. It was hoped in France that, by occupying the Ruhr, she would finally break Germany’s backbone and bring us into a desperate economic position in which we should be forced to assume very heavy obligations.
By the occupation of the Ruhr, Fate once more offered the German nation a chance of asserting itself; for what at first glance seemed to be a terrible mis¬ fortune, contained, on closer observation, extremely promising possibilities of ending the sufferings of Germany.
For the first time France had truly and deeply estranged England—not merely the British diplomats who had concluded the French alliance and