When a man’s discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called opinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not: and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing, as the person; and the resolution is called “belief,” and “faith”: “faith,” in the man, “belief,” both of the man, and of the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions; one of the saying of the man, the other of his virtue. To “have faith in,” or “trust to,” or “believe a man,” signify the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: but to “believe what is said,” signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we are to observe that this phrase, “I believe in,” as also the Latin, credo in , and the Greek, πιςέυω ἐις , are never used but in the writings of divines. Instead of them, in other writings are put, “I believe him,” “I trust him”; “I have faith in him”; “I rely on him”; and in Latin credo illi, fido illi