When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in particular things, as when upon the sight of any one thing, we conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it; if that which he thought likely to follow, follows not, or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called “error”; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we reason in words of general signification, and fall upon a general inference which is false, though it be commonly called “error,” it is indeed an “absurdity,” or senseless speech. For error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come, yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a general assertion, unless it be a true one, the possibility of it is inconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call “absurd,” “insignificant,” and “nonsense.” And therefore if a man should talk to me of a “round quadrangle”; or, “accidents of bread in cheese”; or, “immaterial substances”; or of “a free subject”; “a free will”; or any “free,” but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an error, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd.