His sixth argument is this: if bishops have their jurisdiction de jure divino , that is, “immediately from God,” they that maintain it should bring some word of God to prove it; but they can bring none. The argument is good; I have therefore nothing to say against it. But it is an argument no less good to prove the Pope himself to have no jurisdiction in the dominion of any other prince.
Lastly, he bringeth for argument the testimony of two popes, Innocent and Leo; and I doubt not he might have alleged with as good reason, the testimonies of all the popes almost since St. Peter. For considering the love of power naturally implanted in mankind, whosoever were made Pope he would be tempted to uphold the same opinion. Nevertheless, they should therein but do, as Innocent and Leo did, bear witness of themselves, and therefore their witness should not be good.
In the fifth book he hath four conclusions. The first is, “that the Pope is not lord of all the world”; the second, “that the Pope is not the lord of all the Christian world”; the third, “that the Pope without his own territory, has not any temporal jurisdiction ‘directly.’ ” These three conclusions are easily granted. The fourth is, “that the Pope has, in the dominions of other princes, the supreme temporal power ‘indirectly,’ ” which is denied; unless he mean by “indirectly,” that he has gotten it by indirect means, then is that also granted. But I understand that when he saith he hath it “indirectly,” he means that such temporal jurisdiction belongeth to him of right, but that this right is but a consequence of his pastoral authority, the which he could not exercise unless he have the other with it; and therefore to the pastoral power, which he calls spiritual, the supreme power civil is necessarily annexed; and that thereby he hath a right to change kingdoms, giving them to one and taking them from another, when he shall think it conduces to the salvation of souls.