And if it were so, that there were a language without any verb answerable to “est,” or “is,” or “be”; yet the men that used it would be not a jot the less capable of inferring, concluding, and of all kind of reasoning, than were the Greeks and Latins. But what then would become of these terms of “entity,” “essence,” “essential,” “essentiality,” that are derived from it, and of many more that depend on these, applied as most commonly they are? They are therefore no names of things; but signs, by which we make known that we conceive the consequence of one name or attribute to another: as when we say, “a man is a living body,” we mean not that the “man” is one thing, the “living body” another, and the “is” or “being” a third; but that the “man” and the “living body” is the same thing; because the consequence, “if he be a man, he is a living body,” is a true consequence, signified by that word “is.” Therefore, “to be a body,” “to walk,” “to be speaking,” “to live,” “to see,” and the like infinitives; also “corporeity,” “walking,” “speaking,” “life,” “sight,” and the like, that signify just the same, are the names of “nothing”; as I have elsewhere more amply expressed.