To which I answer, that these are indeed great difficulties, but not impossibilities; for by education and discipline, they may be, and are sometimes reconciled. Judgment and fancy may have place in the same man; but by turns, as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the Israelites in Egypt were sometimes fastened to their labour of making bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to gather straw; so also may the judgment sometimes be fixed upon one certain consideration, and the fancy at another time wandering about the world. So also reason and eloquence, though not perhaps in the natural sciences, yet in the moral, may stand very well together. For wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of error, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the laws, and not fearing a public enemy; nor between abstaining from injury, and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no such inconsistence of human nature, with civil duties, as some think. I have known clearness of judgment, and largeness of fancy; strength of reason, and graceful elocution; a courage for the war, and a fear for the laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honoured friend,