“And in this maner, this necessite, Retourneth in his place contrary, againe; For nedefully, behoveth it nat be, That thilke thinges fallen in certaine That ben purveyed; but, nedefully, as thei saine, Behoveth it, that thinges which that fall, That thei in certaine ben purveyed all:⁠— “I mene, as though I laboured me in this, To enquire which thing cause of which thing be, As whether that the prescience of God is The certaine cause of the necessite Of thinges that to comen be, parde, Or, if necessite of thing coming Be the cause certaine of the purveying? “But, now, ne enforce I me not, in showing How the order of the causes stant; but wot I, That it behoveth that the befalling Of thinges, wiste before certainly, Be necessarie al seme it not therby That prescience put falling necessayre To thing to come, al fal it foule or faire: “For, if there sit a man yonde on a see, Than by necessite behoveth it That, certes, thine opinion sothe be That wenest or conjectest that he sit. And, furtherover, now ayenwarde yet, Lo, right so is it on the part contrarie; As thus; now herken, for I wol nat tarie: “I say, that if the opinion of the Be sothe, for-that he sit; than say I this, That he mote sitten, by necessite. And thus necessite, in either, is.