financial—the latter really bimetallic in nature from the higher ratio then prevailing between silver and gold in India.
To India it meant a perpetual balance of trade in her favour, if such a phrase can be used of such a situation,—a continual inflow of precious metal. Her capacity of absorption of metal seems as large and unsatisfied as ever, and, on the assumption of an unaltered situation in Europe and America, her function in the world's currency system still remains—feasible and beneficent. It is the most difficult question attending the modern currency crisis, whether such assumption of an unaltered situation is permissible.
Further than this, as a simple matter of fact, Page 296 the currency difficulty with India at the present moment is purely governmental and commercial. The Indian Government has yearly to remit a very large sum to this country in discharge of its gold obligations. In 1873-74, before the great fall in silver commenced, the amount remitted was £13,285,678, which, at the rate of exchange of 1 rupee = 1s. 10.35d., meant 142,657,000 rupees. During the year 1892-3 the amount remitted was £16,532,215, which, at the average rate of exchange in that year, 1s. 2.985d., required a payment of 264,784,150 rupees. If this could have been remitted at the exchange of 1873-74, it would only have needed 177,519,200 rupees, making a difference of 87,274,950 rupees. The result of this is to turn what would be a surplus of revenue into a large deficit. At an estimated exchange of 1s. 4d. per rupee for the past year, a surplus of revenue over expenditure was