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IV. Monopolios de transporte y comunicación.

Lo extendida y universal que es la restricción de la competencia por parte de las corporaciones ferroviarias puede verse en las siguientes palabras concisas, escritas por Charles Francis Adams, presidente del Ferrocarril Union Pacific:

"Irresponsive and secret combinations among railways always have existed, and, so long as the railroad system continues as it now is, they unquestionably always will exist. No law can make two corporations, any more than two individuals, actively undersell each other in any market, if they do not wish to do so. But they can only cease doing so by agreeing, in public or private, on a price below which neither will sell. If they cannot do this publicly, they will assuredly do it secretly. This is what, with alternations of conflict, the railroad companies have done in one way or another; and this is what they are now doing and must always continue to do, until complete change of conditions is brought about. Against this practice, the moment it begins to assume any character of responsibility or permanence, statutes innumerable have been aimed, and clauses strictly interdicting it have of late been incorporated into several State constitutions. The experience of the last few years, if it has proved nothing else, has conclusively demonstrated how utterly impotent and futile such enactments and provisions necessarily are."

Descartando por el momento la última parte de la cita anterior, consideremos la afirmación de que durante toda la historia de las empresas ferroviarias, los acuerdos para limitar la competencia han sido la norma. La investigación más superficial demuestra que esto es un hecho histórico, y está en perfecta consonancia con nuestra afirmación anterior

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